Alex Sotirov
The Rogue CA Demonstration
MD5 collisions against a real certificate authority
Rating
83Impact score
Domains
PKIExploit mitigationBrowser security
Scouting report
Co-authored “Bypassing Browser Memory Protections”, the 2008 paper that showed how attackers were routing around DEP and ASLR, then at 25C3 the same year demonstrated a working rogue certificate authority built on MD5 collisions — which pushed the CA industry off MD5 for good. Co-founded Trail of Bits.
Curator’s note
Demonstrated the theoretical break against a live CA, which is the only kind that moves anyone.
Portrait
Painted from a photograph of Alex Sotirov by Alexander Klink, licensed CC BY 3.0.
Sources
- 01MD5 considered harmful today (2008) win.tue.nl
- 02Bypassing Browser Memory Protections (2008) blackhat.com